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PRACTICAL TIGHT-KNIT BRIEFINGS INCLUDING ACTION GUIDELINES ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACT TOPICS

GOVERNMENT LAWYERING
By Jessica Tillipman and Robert B. Mahini

T

he legal profession is regulated with numerous ethical rules designed to ensure that practitioners
comply with its high standards of professional conduct. Federal Government attorneys, while
generally held to the same ethical standards as other attorneys, are subject to an additional set of
requirements mandated by federal laws and regulations. Given the considerable authority federal attorneys possess as representatives of the U.S. Government, it is not surprising that there are complex
rules and regulations specifically designed to ensure Government attorneys’ power is not without
limit, is used properly, and is exercised in accordance with the expectations of the general public.

This BRIEFING PAPER focuses on the laws most crucial to the protection of the public welfare—and,
incidentally, those most likely to frame the day-to-day activities of the Federal Government lawyer—
(1) the ethical obligations of the Government
IN BRIEF
attorney, and (2) the Government attorney’s duty
to properly maintain information. In addition,
Ethical Obligations
although attorneys play a prominent role through■ Gifts From Outside Sources
out the Federal Government, the discussion will
■ Gifts Between Government Employees
■ Conﬂicting Financial Interests/Impartiality In
be limited to several of the most prominent laws
Performing Duties
affecting Executive Branch Government attorneys.
■ Seeking Other Employment
■
■
■

Misuse Of Position
Outside Or Unofﬁcial Activities
Hatch Act

Obligations To Control Information
■
■
■
■
■
■

Freedom Of Information Act
FOIA Exemption 3
FOIA Exemption 4
FOIA Exemption 5
FOIA Exemption 6
Whistleblower Protection Act

The first part of this BRIEFING PAPER discusses
fundamental ethical obligations that are applicable
to nearly all attorneys in the Executive Branch
of Government. In particular, this part discusses
the various statutes and regulations designed
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to ensure Government attorneys perform their
duties impartially and with the public welfare in
mind. In addition, the laws discussed ensure that
the power and authority vested in Government
attorneys is used for neither private nor political
gain.
The second part of this PAPER covers the topics
of information control and confidentiality. Though
generally subject to the same confidentiality rules
that should be familiar to any attorney, Government
attorneys are privy to nonpublic and sometimes
even classified information,1 the confidentiality
of which is crucial for the proper functioning of
the Federal Government. This places Government
attorneys in a unique position with regard to the
information in their possession as compared to
their private sector counterparts. Moreover, this
part of the PAPER explains the tension between these
confidentiality requirements and the Freedom
of Information Act2—a law intended to ensure
transparency in the operation of the Federal
Government. Finally, this part provides a brief
discussion of the Whistleblower Protection Act, 3
which is designed to protect federal employees
who disclose information relating to Government
wrongdoing from adverse employment actions
made in response to the whistleblowing.

Ethical Obligations
Attorneys are no stranger to ethical rules—they
are the underpinning of the profession. Government attorneys, however, must comply not only
with ethical rules imposed by the state bar in which
the attorney is licensed, but with rules unique to
Government employment. Specifically, one of
the primary duties of a Government attorney is

to uphold the ethical standards required of the
position. Because these public servants are expected to hold their positions as a “public trust,”
they are required to comply with a multitude of
regulations designed to ensure they place “loyalty
to the Constitution, laws and ethical principles
above private gain.”4
The ethical regime governing attorneys who
are Executive Branch employees, the focus of
this B RIEFING P APER , is found in Part 2635 of
Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations. These
regulations were created by the U.S. Office of
Government Ethics, which has been charged
with “[p]romulgating…regulations that establish a single, comprehensive, and clear set of
executive-branch standards of conduct.” 5 These
“Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees
of the Executive Branch” provide countless
rules, exceptions, and exclusions that assist
the attorneys of the Executive Branch in making ethical decisions as stewards of the Federal
Government.
In 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101, the regulations describe the general ethical principles applicable
to all Executive Branch employees, including
Government attorneys. The principles have been
separated into 14 different categories,6 but they
share the same two underlying tenets:7
(1) Employees “shall not use public ofﬁce for
private gain.”
(2) Employees “shall act impartially and not
give preferential treatment to any private
organization or individual.”
In addition to these regulations, attorneys are
subject to various criminal conflict-of-interest
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statutes, which are discussed in detail below.8
Government attorneys must also comply with any
supplemental ethics regulations issued by their
employing agency.9
While Government attorneys must act in accordance with all 14 general principles, this BRIEFING
PAPER focuses on those that are most relevant to
their daily practice. These particular principles
prohibit attorneys from engaging in the following conduct:10
(1) Holding a ﬁnancial interest that conﬂicts
with the performance of the attorney’s
duties.
(2) Engaging in a ﬁnancial transaction or
furthering a ﬁnancial interest by using
nonpublic Government information.
(3) Soliciting or accepting a gift or other item
of monetary value from a person seeking
to obtain an ofﬁcial action from, doing
business with, or conducting an activity
regulated by the employee’s agency.
(4) Using public ofﬁce for private gain.
(5) Giving preferential treatment to an organization or individual.
(6) Failing to protect and conserve federal
property and using it for other than authorized activities.
(7) Engaging in outside employment activities,
including seeking or negotiating employment, that conﬂict with ofﬁcial duties.
In addition to these specific obligations, Government attorneys should not take action or engage in activities that may create the appearance
that they violate ethical standards.11 The rules’
prohibition of even the appearance of unethical
behavior demonstrates that the rules were written
not only to hold Government employees to the
highest ethical standards, but also to ensure the
public has confidence in their ethical behavior.
Although the rules discussed below apply in
general to all Executive Branch employees, the
discussion in this BRIEFING PAPER is framed in
terms of compliance with their requirements by
Government attorneys.
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters

■

Gifts From Outside Sources

The rules governing gifts to Government attorneys fall under three different regimes: the
civil gift statute, located at 5 U.S.C.A. § 7353,
the OGE gift regulations, located at 5 C.F.R.
Part 2635, and the criminal bribery and illegal
gratuities statute, located at 18 U.S.C.A. § 201.
The three regimes govern related conduct and
are relevant depending on the intent behind the
gift and the nature of the item.
The civil gift statute, applicable to Government employees, including attorneys, in all three
branches of Government, prohibits them from
soliciting or accepting of value from a person
either “(1) seeking official action from, doing
business with, or (in the case of executive branch
officers and employees) conducting activities
regulated by, the individual’s employing entity; or
(2) whose interests may be substantially affected
by the performance or nonperformance of the
individual’s official duties.”12 The statute also
requires supervising ethics offices, such as the
OGE, to issue rules or regulations implementing
the statute.13 The OGE has done so at 5 C.F.R. §§
2635.201–.205. The OGE’s gift regulations prohibit similar activity and apply only to Executive
Branch employees. Under these rules, Government attorneys are generally prohibited from
(directly or indirectly) soliciting or accepting
“gifts” either (1) from a prohibited source, or
(2) given because of the attorney’s official position.14 These regulations have strong similarities
to the illegal gratuities statute, 15 though the OGE
gift rules make clear that unless the gifts are
accepted in return for being influenced in the
performance of an official act, the acceptance
does not constitute an illegal gratuity.16
To determine whether it is permissible to accept a gift, the Government attorney must first
determine whether the item actually constitutes
a “gift” under the regulations. A “gift” is defined
broadly and includes many items often provided
in the commercial marketplace, such as gratuities, discounts, hospitality, loans, forbearance,
or other items “having monetary value.”17 This
expansive definition includes free services, special discounts, and training (including typical
expenses associated with training activities, such
as travel, food, and lodging).18 Attorneys must
3
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be cautious whenever a gift is offered because
the broad definition is likely to cover the item
in question.

Flores’s office based on his recommendation,
despite its low ranking as compared to other
applicants. 23

Under certain limited circumstances, items
are excluded from the broad “gift” definition.
Items excluded from this definition include, but
are not limited to, the following: 19

A gift is “improperly solicited or accepted because
of the employee’s ofﬁcial position” under the regulations if it would not have been solicited, offered,
or given if the attorney had not been working for
the Government.24 In addition, the prohibition
applies to circumstances under which the gift is
either solicited or accepted indirectly, which includes
(1) gifts given with the attorney’s knowledge and
consent to a member of his immediate family (or
dependent relative) because of the family member’s
relationship to the attorney, or (2) given to any
other person or organization (including charities)
“on the basis of designation, recommendation, or
other speciﬁcation by the employee.”25 This rule is
designed to prevent Government employees from
sidestepping the gift ban by either funneling gifts
through an intermediary or seeking the enrichment
of a family member or any other designated person
or entity. If a Government attorney cannot accept
the gift directly, the attorney should not attempt
to do so through or for another person.

(a) Modest items of food and refreshments,
such as a cup of coffee or doughnut, so
long as they are not part of a meal.
(b) Items with “little intrinsic value,” such as
greeting cards or plaques.
(c) Loans from banks or ﬁnancial institutions
at favorable rates or commercial discounts,
as long as they are offered on the same or
similar terms offered to the general public.
(d) An item purchased at market value by the
employee.
Assuming the item is a “gift” under the regulations, the Government attorney must then
determine whether the item was impermissibly
provided (1) by a prohibited source or (2)
because of the Government attorney’s official
position.21 The regulations define a “prohibited
source” as a person or organization who (a)
seeks official action or to do business with the
Government employee’s agency, (b) conducts
business or activities with or is regulated by the
employee’s agency, or (c) has interests that may
be affected by performance or nonperformance
of the employee’s official duties.22 For example,
a 2009 investigation by the Department of
Justice Office of Inspector General found that
Robert Flores, the former Administrator of the
DOJ Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, violated the ethics regulations by
accepting a free round of golf from the World
Golf Foundation and not repaying $159 in golf
fees until two years later on the day before he
testified at a congressional hearing on his office’s
procurement practices. The OIG determined
that the World Golf Foundation was a prohibited source because at the time Flores accepted
the free golf game, the foundation’s First Tee
program, a program designed to teach golf to
inner city children, was a grantee of the OJJDP
and it later also received a $500,000 grant from
4

There are several exceptions to the general
prohibition against the receipt of gifts by Government employees which, if applicable, allow
the acceptance of a gift by an attorney without
violating these rules.26 These include, but are not
limited to the following:
(a) Gifts of $20 or less—A Government attorney
may accept unsolicited gifts with an aggregate
market value of $20 or less per source per occasion, so long as the aggregate market value of
individual gifts received from a single person
does not exceed $50 in a calendar year. 27 The
$20 cap is a limit on the value of the entire
item, not a credit that can be applied in paying
for the gift. Thus, for example, if an attorney is
offered lunch, valued at $40, the attorney may
not accept the offer even if the attorney pays
the $20 difference. On the other hand, if the
attorney is given several segregable items, such
as a $15 mug and $10 pen, while attending a
conference, he may accept one of the items,
but not both. 28 The exception is inapplicable to
gifts of cash or investment interests, such as
stocks or bonds. 29
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters
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(b) Gifts based on a personal relationship—A
Government attorney may accept gifts given
because of a family or personal relationship and
not because of the attorney’s position.30 Gifts are
permitted under this exception where it is clear
that the gift is “motivated by a family relationship
or personal friendship rather than the position
of the employee.”31
(c) Discounts and similar benefits—The exception for discounts and similar benefits includes
both items exempt from the definition of gift32
and other reduced rates, reduced membership
fees, and favorable rates/commercial discounts
offered because of the attorney’s status in a
particular group or professional qualifications
but unrelated to the attorney’s position with the
Government.33
(d) Awards and honorary degrees—A Government
attorney may accept a gift, other than cash or
investment interests, with a market value of $200
or less, as long as it is a “bona fide award” (or
incident to) that is given for meritorious public
service or achievement by a person or organization without interests that may be substantially
affected by the performance or nonperformance
of the attorney’s official duties.34 If the gift has
an aggregate market value in excess of $200 and
otherwise qualifies under this exception, it “may
be accepted upon a written determination by an
agency ethics official that the award is made as
part of an established program of recognition.”35
(e) Gifts based on outside business or employment
relationship—A Government attorney may accept
gifts, including meals, lodgings, and transportation, as long as they are provided because of the
business or employment activities of the attorney’s
spouse or the outside employment/business
activities of the attorney and not because of the
attorney’s official position.36
(f) Widely attended gatherings—A Government
attorney may accept free attendance at an event
of more than 100 persons, so long as the value of
the gift of attendance is no more than $335 and
received from a person other than a sponsor of the
event.37 “Free attendance” is defined as including
a waiver of all or part of the fees associated with
the conference, including “food, refreshments,
entertainment, instruction and materials furnished
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters

to all attendees as an integral part of the event.”38
It does not include expenses for transportation
and lodging or for “entertainment collateral to
the event, or meals taken other than in a group
setting with all other attendees.”39 This exemption
applies when, among numerous other requirements, it has been determined that the employee’s
attendance is in the interest of the agency.40 This
is an extraordinarily complicated exception to the
gift rules. Attorneys are, therefore, urged (and,
under certain circumstances, required) to obtain
agency advice and/or permission to attend the
event.
While an item may appear to qualify under
one of these exceptions, attorneys still need to be
careful. The OGE warns that even if an employee
may accept a gift under its rules, it “is never wrong
and is often wise to decline a gift offered by a
person or organization whose interests could
be affected by actions of the agency where you
work or a gift offered because of your official
position.”41
More importantly, under certain circumstances,
a “gift” that falls under one of the exceptions
must be rejected if one of the following three
circumstances is present:42
(1) The gift has been given to inﬂuence the
employee to perform an ofﬁcial act.
(2) The employee has solicited or coerced the
offering of the gift.
(3) The employee accepts gifts so frequently
(from a same or different source) “that a
reasonable person would be led to believe
the employee is using his public ofﬁce for
private gain.”
Acceptance of gifts under these three circumstances could land a Government attorney
in hot water. Moreover, a violation of the first
circumstance may even run afoul of the criminal
bribery and illegal gratuities statute, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 201.43 Note that unlike the ethics regulations,
the criminal statute’s prohibitions are not limited
to the recipient; offenses under the statute may
be committed by both the recipient and the provider of the gift.44 The statute’s prohibition against
bribery, as applicable to Government attorneys,
“requires a showing that something of value was…
5
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corruptly demanded, sought, received, accepted,
or agreed to be received or accepted by a public
official” in return for “being influenced in the
performance of any official act.”45 To establish an
offense of bribery, a quid pro quo is required—or
a specific intent to “receive something of value
in exchange for an official act.”46
The prohibition against gratuities, as applicable
to Government attorneys, “requires a showing
that something of value was…demanded, sought,
received, accepted, or agreed to be received or
accepted by a public official…‘for or because of
any official act performed or to be performed
by such public official.’” 47 Unlike bribery, a quid
pro quo is not required, and a violation may be
established by demonstrating that the “thing of
value” is “merely a reward for some future act that
the public official will take…or for a past act that
he has already taken.”48 In other words, there is
no requirement to establish corrupt intent.
All Government attorneys must keep the criminal bribery and illegal gratuities statute in mind
when they are offered a “thing of value” or “gift”
from an outside source. If an attorney decides to
accept such an item, criminal violations are always
a risk, as evidenced by the April 2010 conviction
of Constantine Peter Kallas, the former Assistant
Chief Counsel with U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement for, among 36 criminal charges,
accepting bribes as high as $20,000 from illegal
aliens and green card holders in exchange for
promising to use his official position to provide
them with immigration benefits. Kallas faces a
maximum sentence of up to 256 years in prison
for his crimes.49
Even if acceptance of a particular item does not
rise to the level of criminality, exemptions from
the gift rules are extremely narrow and complicated, and a violation could still result in severe
disciplinary action, including the loss of a job.50
For this reason, it is imperative that attorneys take
care when accepting gifts from outside sources. As
another BRIEFING PAPERS author has recommended,
“unless a gift falls neatly within an exclusion or
exception, the safest course of action is to assume
the gift is prohibited.”51 Before accepting a gift,
Government attorneys faced with ethical issues
relating to the gift rules are strongly advised to
obtain guidance from an agency ethics official
6

and to consult the regulations directly.52 If a Government attorney has received a gift that cannot
be accepted, the attorney must “promptly” “on
his own initiative” comply with the regulations’
requirements regarding “proper disposition of
prohibited gifts” to avoid being deemed to have
improperly accepted an unsolicited gift.53 “Proper
disposition” includes returning the item to the
donor, paying the donor the market value of the
gift, or, if the item is perishable, donating the gift
to charity, sharing it with the attorney’s colleagues,
or destroying it.54 With respect to entertainment,
services, or other intangible gifts, the attorney
may “reimburse the donor the market value.”55
“Subsequent reciprocation by the employee does
not constitute reimbursement.”56
■

Gifts Between Government Employees

In addition to gifts from outside sources, gift
giving between Government employees, including
attorneys, is regulated. 57 These rules are particularly relevant in Government offices during the
holidays and when celebrating employee birthdays.
Generally, the regulations prohibit Government
attorneys from directly or indirectly giving or
soliciting contributions for gifts to an “official
superior.58 An “official superior” is defined as
“including but not limited to an immediate supervisor, whose official responsibilities include
directing or evaluating the performance of the
employee‘s official duties or those of any other
official superior of the employee.”59 For purposes
of these gift rules, an employee is considered to
be the subordinate of any of his official superiors.60 Government attorneys are also prohibited
from accepting gifts from Government employees
receiving less pay.61 The latter rule does not apply when (a) Government attorneys are not in
a subordinate-official superior relationship, or
(b) a personal relationship exists between the
two Government employees.62 In addition, the
regulations make clear that “official superior”
Government attorneys are prohibited from coercing the offering of a gift from a subordinate.63 In
other words, Government attorneys in positions
of power and authority should not demand gifts
from the individuals they supervise.
When compared to private sector gift-giving
practices, the Government prohibition appears
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters
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far more restrictive. This blanket prohibition is
somewhat softened by several exceptions to the
general prohibition. Speciﬁcally, the rules permit
on an “occasional basis,” during celebrations or
occasions in which “gifts are traditionally given
or exchanged,” the following gifts to a superior
employee or from an employee receiving less pay:64
(1) Noncash gifts, with an aggregate market
value of $10 or less per occasion.
(2) Food and refreshments if shared in the
ofﬁce among several employees.
(3) Personal hospitality provided at a residence
(only if of a type and value customarily provided by the attorney to personal friends).
(4) Items given in connection with the receipt
of personal hospitality if of a type and value
customarily given on such occasions.
(5) Under certain circumstance, the transfer
of employee “leave,” so long as it is not to
an immediate supervisor.
In addition to these exceptions, the regulations
allow gifts for “special, infrequent occasions”
(e.g., important events such as marriage, illness,
retirement, or resignation)65 and for “voluntary
contributions of nominal amounts” for a gift,
if given infrequently, for a special occasion, or
for food and refreshments to be shared among
office employees.66
■

Conflicting Financial Interests/Impartiality In
Performing Duties

Similar to the gift restrictions, the statute and
implementing regulations regarding conflicting
financial interests and impartiality are designed
to prevent favorable treatment and impropriety in Government actions. In particular, these
regulations prohibit a Government attorney from
engaging in conflicting activities involving actual
bias by the Government attorney and in those
that merely give the appearance of such biased
conflict.
With respect to conﬂicting ﬁnancial interests,
18 U.S.C.A. § 208 prohibits a covered Government
attorney from participating “personally and substantially” in an ofﬁcial Government action or other
“particular matter,” in which “he, his spouse, minor
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters

child, general partner, organization in which he is
serving as ofﬁcer, director, trustee, general partner
or employee, or any person or organization with
whom he is negotiating or has any arrangement
concerning prospective employment, has a ﬁnancial
interest.”67 A “ﬁnancial interest” exists when, as the
result of developments in a matter, there is a very
real, as opposed to speculative, possibility of gain
or loss.68
The prohibitions in this statute are clariﬁed in
the implementing regulations.69 “Particular matters”
are deﬁned by the regulations as those “that involve
deliberation, decision, or action that is focused upon
the interests of speciﬁc persons, or a discrete and
identiﬁable class of persons.”70 In other words, the
deﬁnition does not encompass broad policy matters
designed to affect the interests of large, diverse groups
of individuals.71 Examples of “particular matters”
include judicial (or other) proceedings, requests
for a ruling or other determination, contracts, applications, claims, or controversies.72 In addition,
the Government attorney’s participation must be
both personal and substantial, involving the direct
participation of the attorney or the attorney’s supervision of a subordinate’s direct participation in
a matter.73 If a Government attorney is faced with a
situation prohibited by these regulations, absent a
waiver, the attorney must either divest the interest
or disqualify himself or herself from the matter.74
The purpose of the statute and its implementing
regulations is to prevent Government attorneys
from advancing their personal interests at the
expense of the public welfare.75 DOJ attorney
Robert Coughlin did just that when he violated,
among other statutes, 18 U.S.C.A. § 208. While
working at the DOJ, Coughlin accepted over $4,000
worth of meals and sports tickets from lobbyist
Kevin Ring, who worked for then-lobbyist and
now-convicted felon, Jack Abramoff. 76 Coughlin
accepted these gifts in exchange for, among many
other things, leaking internal information, setting up meetings, and lobbying his colleagues
at the DOJ on behalf of Abramoff’s clients.77 In
addition, Coughlin helped waive a competitive
bidding requirement and secure a $16.3 million grant for one of Abramoff’s clients—a feat
that involved persuading other DOJ officials to
reverse an original award of $9 million.78 Following Coughlin’s guilty plea, the judge sentenced
7
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Coughlin to 30 days in a halfway house and three
years supervised release and ordered him to pay
a $2,000 fine.79
In addition to prohibiting conflicting financial
interests, the regulations regarding impartiality
prohibit Government attorneys from engaging
in activities that merely give the appearance of
bias in the performance of official duties. Two
circumstances are covered under this prohibition. First, a Government attorney is prohibited
from participating in matters that are likely to
affect the financial interests of a member of the
attorney’s household or a person with whom
the attorney has a “covered relationship” where
these circumstances would cause a “reasonable
person with knowledge of the relevant facts to
question [the attorney’s] impartiality in the matter.”80 A “covered relationship” is one in which the
employee has a very close personal or business
relationship with an individual.81 For example,
a DOJ attorney may not participate in a matter
in which he is responsible for investigating and
potentially prosecuting a company that employs
his spouse. Under these circumstances, the attorney is prohibited from participating in the
matter unless authorized after disclosure to an
agency designee.82
The second type of impartial activity covered by
the regulations relates to Government attorneys
who have received extraordinary severance (or
other) payments from former employers before
employment with the Government. 83 If such
payment is received, the attorney is disqualified
for two years from participating in particular
matters in which the former employer is a party
(or represents a party). 84 An “extraordinary
payment” includes cash or other investment
interests valued greater than $10,000 and paid
after it has been made known to the former employer that the attorney is under consideration
for or has accepted a Government position and
is unrelated to the former employer’s “established compensation, partnership, or benefits
program.” 85 “A compensation, partnership, or
benefits program will be deemed an established
program if it is contained in bylaws, a contract
or other written form, or if there is a history of
similar payments made to others not entering
into Federal service.”86 The disqualification may
8

be waived by the attorney’s agency if it is determined that the payment is “not so substantial
as to cause a reasonable person to question the
[attorney’s] ability to act impartially in a matter
in which the former employer is or represents
a party.” 87
■

Seeking Other Employment

Ethical restrictions applicable to Government
attorneys are not limited to their employment
with the Government. An attorney seeking employment outside the Government is also subject
to a complex set of regulations designed to prevent conflicts of interest, bias, and other ethical
quandaries that may give outsiders the impression
that the attorney lacks the necessary impartiality.
Similar to the conflict-of-interest regulations,88
the OGE regulations regarding seeking employment outside the Government are designed to
ensure compliance with the authorizing statute,
18 U.S.C.A. § 208(a), which requires “an employee [to] disqualify himself from participation
in any particular matter that will have a direct
and predictable effect on the financial interests
of a person ‘with whom he is negotiating or has
any arrangement concerning prospective employment.’”89 The regulations broadly define “employment” as “any form of non-Federal employment
or business relationship involving the provision of
personal services by the employee, whether to be
undertaken at the same time as or subsequent to
Federal employment.”90 A Government attorney
is deemed to be “seeking employment” when,
either directly or indirectly:91
(a) The attorney is engaged in actual negotiations for employment;
(b) A prospective employer has contacted the
attorney about possible employment and
the attorney makes a response other than
rejection; or
(c) The attorney has contacted a prospective
employer about possible employment, unless the sole purpose of the contact is to
request a job application or if the person
contacted is affected by the performance
of the attorney’s duties only as part of an
industry.
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters
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The regulations define “negotiations” for employment broadly as any “discussion or communication with another person, or such person’s agent
or intermediary, mutually conducted with a view
toward reaching an agreement regarding possible
employment with that person” and “not limited
to discussions of specific terms and conditions of
employment in a specific position.”92 While general or exploratory discussions do not constitute
negotiations, when a “potential employer and
potential employee engage in discussions with a
specific position in mind, they are negotiating,
even if all the details are not discussed.” 93
A Government attorney is no longer seeking
employment under the regulations if (1) either
party rejects the possibility of employment and
all discussions of possible employment cease, or
(2) two months have elapsed since the attorney’s
submission of an unsolicited resume and the
attorney has received no expression of interest
from the prospective employer.94 To be clear, a
rejection must be overt and obvious—a deferral
of employment discussions until sometime in
the near future is not considered a “rejection”
of prospective employment.95
To prevent a violation of the relevant statutory and regulatory authority, an attorney must
either (a) terminate employment discussions or
(b) voluntarily cease the personal and substantial participation in the particular matter that
will have a “direct and predictable effect on the
financial interests of a prospective employer with
whom [the attorney] is seeking employment.”96
■

Misuse Of Position

In addition to improper influence from outside
sources, the ethics rules also heavily regulate a
Government attorney’s use of official time and
position.97 These rules include four different
prohibitions: (1) use of public office for private
gain, (2) use of nonpublic information, (3) use
of Government property, and (4) use of official
property.98
The first prohibition bars Government attorneys
from using their public office for their own (or
another’s) private gain.99 Specifically, the regulations prohibit a Government attorney from using
the attorney’s official position to induce or coerce
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters

other persons “to provide any benefit, financial
or otherwise, to [the attorney] or to friends,
relatives, or persons with whom the [attorney]
is affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity.”100
The rule is straightforward: Government attorneys may not use their official title and office
to scare or threaten another person into giving
them something for private gain. A correlating
provision prohibits a Government attorney from
using the attorney’s title or “authority” to imply
that the Government has sanctioned or endorsed
the attorney’s personal activities.101 Similarly,
Government attorneys are prohibited from using
their position and the Government’s authority to
endorse products, services, or enterprises, unless
statutory authority or agency standards exist to do
so or “as the result of recognition for achievement
given under an agency program of recognition for
accomplishment in support of the agency‘s mission.”102 While these prohibitions prevent clearly
egregious abuses of power, they also ensure that
Government attorneys are properly representing
themselves when engaged in outside activities. If,
for example, a Government attorney wishes to
represent a pro bono client, the attorney must
make clear that the legal advice is not coming
from the Government and that the attorney is
acting in his or her individual capacity.103
The second prohibition forbids a Government
attorney from engaging in a financial transaction,
or otherwise seeking to further a private interest, using nonpublic information.104 “Nonpublic
information” is defined as “information that the
employee gains by reason of Federal employment
and that [the employee] knows or reasonably
should know has not been made available to the
general public,” including information deemed
confidential by law (or designated as such by an
agency official) or otherwise not made available
to the public.105
The third and fourth prohibitions on the
“misuse” of an attorney’s position deal with the
use of Government property and “official time.”
Specifically, unless otherwise authorized to do
so, an attorney may not use Government property (e.g., Government computers, phones, and
office supplies) for unauthorized purposes.106
Similarly, unless authorized to spend “official
time” for unofficial purposes, an attorney’s
9
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“official time” must be used “in an honest effort
to perform official duties.”107 The regulations
also prohibit an attorney from ordering a subordinate to use official time to perform unofficial
or unauthorized activities.108 These prohibitions
are no different than the rules found in private
offices across the country that ban an employee’s
use of an employer’s computer to send messages
to friends on Facebook or the employer’s phone
to make lengthy, long-distance personal calls or
prohibit the employee from spending time “on
the clock” running personal errands. While the
OGE regulations generally prohibit the use of
office materials and official time for unofficial
purposes, many agencies have promulgated
regulations that permit such activity as long as
the cost to the Government is negligible.109 For
example, if a Government attorney wants to
represent a pro bono client, the attorney may
use small amounts of paper, use a Government
computer in a limited manner, and make a limited number of local phone calls to handle the
matter.110 While this is permitted under certain
circumstances, attorneys must be careful as the
line between what is considered negligible and
what is deemed a misuse of Government property
is not always clear. Thus, as with the other ethics
regulations, Government attorneys should seek
the opinion of an agency ethic’s official before
seeking to use Government property or time for
personal reasons.
■

Outside Or Unofficial Activities

In addition to an attorney’s official actions,
the ethics regulations apply to a Government
attorney’s unofficial activities outside the office.
For example, many Government attorneys teach
classes at local law schools, while others may hold
leadership positions in professional organizations.
These activities are not only permitted under the
regulations, they are also often encouraged by
high-ranking agency officials seeking to increase
the prominence of their agency’s attorneys.
The rules relating to outside activities apply
regardless of whether the attorney receives compensation.111 Moreover, while generally permitted, attorneys must be certain that the activities
comply with a host of additional requirements
and limitations.112 These include, but are not
10

limited to, the prohibition on outside employment or any other outside activity that conflicts
with the employee’s official duties, any agencyspecific requirement for prior approval of outside
employment or activities, and limitations on
outside earned income, participation in professional organizations, or paid/unpaid teaching,
speaking, and writing opportunities. 113 Activities
must also comply with the various statutes and
regulations that prohibit, in general, the use
of public office for private gain and providing
preferential treatment to any particular private
organization or individual.114
For example, an attorney may not disclose
nonpublic information while teaching class at
a law school.115 Although disclosing nonpublic
anecdotes about an agency matter would undoubtedly maintain students’ level of interest,
such behavior would violate the law. The regulations covering outside activities are lengthy and
complex, so again attorneys are encouraged, and
often required, to speak to their agency ethics
officials before engaging in or accepting an outside opportunity.
■

Hatch Act

Government attorneys must also be aware of
the legal constraints on their political activity.
The “Hatch Act” regulates the political activities
of Executive Branch attorneys.116 The level and
type of restrictions on political activity are directly
correlated to an attorney’s position. Specifically,
Government attorneys are generally divided into
two categories: “Less Restricted Government
employees” and “Further Restricted Government
employees.”117 Special, unrestricted rules govern
a third and less common group of Government
employees. This group includes Government attorneys appointed by the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate and those
paid from an appropriation for the Executive
Office of the President.118 The political activities
of these Government attorneys are fairly unrestricted, so long as the activities are not paid for
by money from the U.S. Treasury.119
Most Executive Branch attorneys fall under the
“Less Restricted Government employees” category,
allowing them to engage in common political
activities.120 In contrast, attorneys categorized
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as “Further Restricted Government employees”
are typically employed by agencies devoted to
intelligence, law enforcement, and elections and
are prohibited from engaging in most partisan
political activity.121
“Less Restricted” Government attorneys may
engage in a wide variety of political activities,
including, but not limited to, running for office
in nonpartisan elections, campaigning for or
against candidates in partisan elections, assisting
in voter registration drives, contributing to political organizations, attending political fundraisers,
rallies, or meetings, or actively participating or
holding office in a political party or club.122 They
are still, however, prohibited from engaging in
certain political activities as representatives of the
Federal Government, such as the following:123
(1) Improperly using ofﬁcial authority to inﬂuence an election.
(2) Soliciting or discouraging the political
activity of a person with business before
the attorney’s agency.
(3) Running for ofﬁce in a partisan political
election.
(4) Engaging in political activity while on duty,
in a Government ofﬁce, wearing an ofﬁcial
uniform, using a Government vehicle, or
using an ofﬁcial title or position.
(5) Hosting political fundraisers.
(6) Accepting donations for a partisan political group, party or candidate for partisan
political ofﬁce.
In addition, “Less Restricted” supervisory attorneys
are prohibited from inviting subordinate Government attorneys to political events or activities or
suggesting “that they attend the political event or
undertake any partisan political activity.”124 Moreover, while either on duty or in a federal building,
they may not, for example, wear partisan items of
clothing or accessories, distribute or display campaign materials, post partisan statements (including blog postings) on the internet, or send emails
advocating for or against “a partisan political party,
candidate for partisan political ofﬁce, or partisan
political group.”125
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The last restriction tends to cause the most
problems for Government attorneys, as evidenced
by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel’s charges
filed against Bruce Buchanan, an attorney for
the National Labor Relations Board.126 The OSC
alleged, among other charges, that while on duty
and in his NLRB office, Buchanan prepared two
briefing memoranda for a candidate for U.S.
Senate in which he used his official Government
title.127 Moreover, while on duty, Buchanan also
allegedly “solicited the assistance of a subordinate employee” to prepare memoranda for the
campaign (including one which sought campaign
contributions), and made a telephone call on
behalf of the candidate to an organization with
business before the NLRB.128 The OSC charged
Buchanan with five different Hatch Act violations,
and in a consent judgment, Buchanan admitted to
violating the law and agreed to be removed from
federal employment.129 While this case involved a
significant number of Hatch Act violations, lesser
activity may still run afoul of the law.
Unlike “Less Restricted Government attorneys,”
“Further Restricted Government attorneys,” as the
name indicates, have far less freedom to engage
in political activities due to the nature of work
conducted at their agencies. These Government
attorneys are permitted to engage in certain
activities such as assisting in nonpartisan voting
registration drives or campaigns in which none
of the candidates represents a political party,
contributing money to political organizations or
attending political events, or being a candidate
for public office in a nonpartisan election.130
“Further Restricted Government attorneys,”
however, are prohibited from engaging in the
same activities as “Less Restricted Government
attorneys,” plus many others relating to partisan
political activity.131 The OSC provides a lengthy
list of prohibited activities on its website.132
In recent years, the most common violations
of the Hatch Act have resulted from an employee’s political activities on the internet. Sending
political emails or posting political messages
on websites during the work day may result in
a violation of the law. For example, the OSC
filed a complaint charging an Internal Revenue
Service agent with violating the Hatch Act when
he forwarded an email to numerous individuals
11
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(including co-workers) from then-presidential
candidate Barack Obama soliciting online campaign contributions. 133 The agent sent the email
while on duty from his Government office, “and
the e-mail included his name, title, group, duty
location, and telephone number.”134 Although the
Merit Systems Protection Board determined the
violation did not warrant removal in this matter,
it found otherwise in a similar case involving an
Assistant U.S. Trustee employed at the DOJ. The
MSPB ordered the removal of the attorney for
her violations of the Hatch Act because, unlike
the IRS agent, she solicited contributions from
subordinate Government attorneys.135 In this
matter, the attorney violated the Hatch Act by
“using her official authority or influence to coerce a subordinate employee” to make a political
contribution to a gubernatorial candidate.136 She
also admitted that she was aware of the Hatch
Act and knew the solicitation “was a little outside
the rules.” 137 While both cases involved a single
solicitation without followup action, the MSPB
opinion ordering removal appears to rely heavily
on the fact that the matter involved the coercion
of a subordinate.138
The decision to remove an employee from
office for violating the Hatch Act turns on
numerous factors. As explained by the MSPB,
“[g]enerally, a Hatch Act violation warrants removal if it occurred under circumstances demonstrating a deliberate disregard of the Act.”139 For
Government attorneys, removal is a serious risk,
especially for those who are aware of the Hatch
Act and should know better than to engage in
such activity. For example, a staff attorney at the
Small Business Administration lost his job at the
agency because, even though he was aware of the
Hatch Act and its prohibitions, he “received, read,
drafted or sent more than 100 emails” using his
Government computer to engage in prohibited
political activity. 140 Even if a matter does not result
in such a severe penalty, violations of the Hatch
Act may warrant suspension from work without
pay.141 Likewise, given the high ethical standards
to which Government attorneys are held, ethical
violations of this nature are likely to result in a
significant black mark on an attorney’s career.
Thus, attorneys are encouraged to check the
OSC’s Hatch Act website for information,142 request an advisory opinion from the OSC Hatch
12

Act Unit,143 or seek counsel from their agency
ethics advisors before engaging in any partisan
political activities.

Obligations To Control Information
Similar to the rules regarding ethics, all attorneys, whether or not they work for the Government, must take care of the information
entrusted with them. Every state’s ethical rules
require attorneys to maintain the confidentiality of information provided to them by clients.
For example, the District of Columbia’s Rules of
Professional Conduct provide, with very limited
exceptions, that a lawyer cannot knowingly “reveal a confidence or secret of the lawyer’s client,”
an obligation that “continues after termination
of the lawyer’s employment.”144 Such duties of
confidentiality certainly apply to Government
attorneys. Indeed, the District of Columbia’s
ethical rules make this clear for its attorneys by
providing that, for purposes of its confidentiality requirements, the “client of the government
lawyer is the agency that employs the lawyer”
unless otherwise provided in the law.145
However, Government attorneys face a unique
tension with their handling of nonpublic information. On one hand, many statutes and regulations require Government attorneys to protect
and withhold information from third parties,
augmenting the ethical rules’ requirement for
confidential treatment of client information.
On the other hand, ethical rules often allow
Government attorneys to disclose confidential
information where “permitted or authorized by
law”146—an important exception given that federal
law requires agencies to disseminate information requested by the public, and even provides
many Government attorneys and other Government employees with protections to encourage
“whistleblowing” about agency misconduct. In
light of this tension, Government attorneys should
be cognizant of how they create, share, and otherwise handle the large amounts of information
available to them as Executive Branch employees.
The choices that these attorneys make often affect
their competing responsibilities and could even
eliminate options for what can be done with the
materials in question.
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Government attorneys must comply with an
overarching ethical requirement that all attorneys
face: keeping the conﬁdences of their clients, i.e.,
“the agency that employs the lawyer.”147 In addition,
Government attorneys are prohibited by law from
releasing certain information, as seen with the
criminal code’s prohibition against the disclosure
of certain information “relating to the national
defense” by any person authorized to possess such
information to any person not authorized to possess such information—for example, the disclosure
of top secret military information to the media.148
Government attorneys also may be required to
protect certain information under statutes or rules
that apply only to their agency. For example, the
Federal Trade Commission Act makes clear that
the Federal Trade Commission “shall not have
the authority to make public any trade secret or
any commercial of ﬁnancial information which is
obtained for any person and which is privileged or
conﬁdential,” with limited exceptions.149
As a result, Government attorneys should be
cognizant of how their work might be affected
by such statutes and fiercely guard against releasing any materials that fall under the ambit of
specifically prescribed law or rules prohibiting
the disclosure of such information. In addition,
given the general duty of confidentiality to their
“client,” Government attorneys generally should
be careful to keep the confidences of the information entrusted to them by their agencies and
not reveal any information unless required or
permitted to do so by law.
At the same time, the information that Government attorneys obtain and possess is quite
frequently released to individuals and organizations outside their agencies. This BRIEFING PAPER
focuses on the two primary avenues for such
release: the Freedom of Information Act150 and
the Whistleblower Protection Act.151
■

Freedom Of Information Act

The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 552, is the primary vehicle for the public to
request and obtain materials possessed by Government attorneys. First, FOIA requires agencies
to automatically disclose certain types of agency
information, such as final rules or adjudicative
records.152 For any other information not affirBriefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters

matively disclosed, FOIA also generally requires
agencies to “make…promptly available to any
person” such records upon a request that reasonably describes the materials sought.153
However, this requirement to disclose information to a requester is subject to a number of provisions in FOIA that exempt certain materials from
release. By creating these exemptions, Congress
acknowledged that, despite the importance of
encouraging Government transparency and an
informed citizenry, agencies also need to protect
some types of information.154 Thus, FOIA speciﬁcally prohibits “intelligence community” agencies
from making available any records to any foreign
Government entity or representative.155 These
agencies include, among others, the Ofﬁce of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and
various intelligence elements of the Department of
State, the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Defense, and the branches of the
military.156 In addition, Congress allows agencies,
in their discretion, to withhold any materials that
fall under one of the nine exemptions listed at 5
U.S.C.A. § 552(b). The exemptions that are particularly relevant to the practice of most Government
attorneys include:
(a) Materials that are exempted from release
by another statute, such as the provision
prohibiting the FTC from sharing trade
secrets and other conﬁdential business
information described above (Exemption
3).
(b) Materials that are either trade secrets or
privileged or conﬁdential commercial or
ﬁnancial information obtained from a
person (Exemption 4).
(c) Inter- or intra-agency materials that “would
not be available by law to a party…in litigation with the agency,” including privileged
attorney-client communications, attorney
work product, or materials used in the
agency’s internal deliberative process (Exemption 5).
(d) Materials “disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy” (Exemption 6).
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Thus, if one of the FOIA exemptions applies to
the requested information, an agency can choose
to withhold the materials. Given that the agency
may have the discretion to release the materials
even if an exemption applies, assuming no other
statute prohibits disclosure, Government attorneys
should be aware that even exempt materials might
end up in the hands of the public should the
agency’s FOIA official choose to release them. 161
In addition, because FOIA requires the release of
any segregable portions of a document, materials
must be released if the exempt portions can be
redacted and if no other exemption applies to
the remaining information.162
This BRIEFING PAPER focuses on the four FOIA
exemptions described above that are relevant to
the information handling of most Government
attorneys: Exemptions 3, 4, 5, and 6. For specific
guidance regarding FOIA, Government attorneys
should contact their agencies’ designated FOIA
officer.163
■

This exemption is particularly important to
Government attorneys because it provides a
categorical exemption for materials that many
Government attorneys possess, such as the law
enforcement materials that many FTC attorneys
typically seek and obtain from investigative targets.
Accordingly, in addition to learning about the
specific prohibitions against disclosing certain
information, Government attorneys should be well
aware of statutes that exempt certain materials
from FOIA when they assess whether to request,
obtain, or compile information. Given that courts
must determine whether a statute meets the
specific requirements in Exemption 3 necessary
to trigger the exemption, Government attorneys
should check with their agencies’ designated
FOIA officers to learn about the existence and
scope of any such statutes that have been found
to meet the requirements of Exemption 3.168

FOIA Exemption 3

Exemption 3 is FOIA’s “cross-referencing”
exemption, as it authorizes agencies to withhold
materials if another statute either “requires that
the matters be withheld from the public in such
a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue”
or “establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
withheld.”164 Statutes enacted after the enactment
of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, i.e., after October 29, 2009, would also trigger Exemption 3 by
specifically referring to its section in FOIA.165
While not all Government attorneys can look
to other statutes outside of FOIA to protect their
records, such a statute, when one is available,
provides a significant method of protecting
materials from FOIA release. A statute that prohibits sharing, such as the FTC Act’s prohibition
on sharing certain business materials described
above,166 is likely to trigger Exemption 3 as a statute that “leaves no discretion on the issue,” and
thereby excuses—indeed, prohibits—an agency
disclosing such information under FOIA. In addition to statutes that outright prohibit certain
disclosures, a statute may simply exempt from
FOIA disclosure certain materials, as the FTC
Act does with any materials the FTC receives in
14

law enforcement investigations “pursuant to any
compulsory process…or which is provided voluntarily in place of such compulsory process.”167

■

FOIA Exemption 4

The work of Government attorneys frequently
requires them to obtain, review, and otherwise
possess sensitive business information. For instance, Government attorneys often seek and
obtain confidential business information in the
course of a law enforcement investigation to
assist in determining whether any wrongdoing
occurred. Another example is the confidential
business materials typically submitted to support
grant applications or bids or proposals that attorneys often review.169 In addition, companies
may provide confidential information to educate
Government attorneys who are creating rules,
drafting reports, or advising Congress on proposed legislation.
Exemption 4 of FOIA exempts from release
“trade secrets” and any “privileged or confidential” commercial or financial information
received from parties—in other words, certain
confidential business materials.170 This exemption
protects both the interests of those submitting
confidential business documents, as well as the
Government’s interest in obtaining cooperation from parties who might otherwise resist
submitting confidential business information
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for fear that it might end up in the hands of
competitors. 171 Thus, to further these interests
as related to their work, Government attorneys
seeking and possessing such confidential business materials should be aware of the extent to
which such materials are protected from FOIA’s
disclosure requirements. 172
To understand what Exemption 4 protects,
Government attorneys should recognize that the
generally accepted definition of a “trade secret”
for FOIA purposes is a “secret, commercially
valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is
used for the making, preparing, compounding, or
processing of trade commodities and that can be
said to be the end product of either innovation or
substantial effort” and that is directly related to
the productive process.173 Thus, a “trade secret”
is not just any secretive business information—
the term only encompasses information about a
secretive way of creating a product.
Broader protection for commercial business
information comes from Exemption 4’s reference
to “commercial or financial” information that
is either “privileged or confidential.” Attorneys
should be aware that, while courts often construe
this phrase broadly to encompass most information
that relates to commerce,174 whether the material
is confidential so that it is exempt from FOIA
depends on the circumstances. Under the test
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in National
Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, materials
that the submitter was compelled to provide to
the Government are deemed “confidential” if
their release would either “impair the government’s ability to obtain necessary information
in the future” or “cause substantial harm to the
competitive position of the person from whom
the information was obtained.”175 Subsequently,
in Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the Supreme Court determined that
materials that were voluntarily submitted to the
Government are deemed “confidential” if the
submitter does not “customarily” disclose the
information to the public.176 Courts objectively
determine which test to apply based on whether
a legal requirement exists for submitting the
information at issue and not based on the subjective beliefs of the submitter.177 Thus, even if
the agency incorrectly tells the third party that
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providing materials is voluntary or mistakenly
refers to the submission as mandatory, a court
would not be swayed by the agency’s mistaken
representations and will instead focus on whether
the submission truly was mandatory.178
Based on these differing tests, an agency can
more easily justify withholding voluntary submissions because it need only show that the submitter treats the material as confidential. The task
of explaining how the release might affect the
agency’s information-gathering purposes or the
submitter’s competitive position as required for
withholding compelled information is decidedly
more difficult. Thus, a court’s decision on which
standard to apply is critical to its assessment of
the withholding, as it was in Finkel v. U.S. Department of Labor.179 In that case, the agency argued
that certain withheld materials had been voluntarily submitted because the submitters did not
insist on compulsory process, which would have
allowed the agency to argue under the more
lenient Critical Mass standard that the materials
were confidential.180 The court, however, found
that the agency collected the data pursuant to
regulations that gave it the authority to “inspect
and investigate” any workplace, in other words,
“pursuant to regulatory compulsion.”181 As a
result, the court employed the stricter National
Parks test and found that the agency failed that
test and that Exemption 4 did not apply.182 In
light of this important difference between the
National Parks and Critical Mass standards, where
the manner of requesting the information could
affect whether the materials are exempt under
FOIA, Government attorneys should be cognizant
of this distinction when obtaining commercial or
financial information from third parties.
■

FOIA Exemption 5

Nearly all Government attorneys participate in
the planning process at their agencies. Whether
consulting with a client, preparing for litigation,
or determining an agency’s course of action,
Government attorneys create, share, and possess
information that reveals the internal given-andtake typical inside the Executive Branch. FOIA
Exemption 5 protects such materials from public
disclosure. This exemption states that an agency
may withhold from release any “inter-agency or
15
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intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency.”183 Courts
have interpreted this language as exempting from
FOIA those agency materials that are privileged
from discovery in federal civil litigation,184 and the
three key privileges invoked by Exemption 5 are
those protecting attorney-client communications,
attorney work product, and materials created as
part of an agency’s deliberative process.185
As a threshold matter, because of its “interagency” and “intra-agency” qualifiers, Exemption
5 typically protects only those materials that are
not shared outside of the Executive Branch.
Thus, once materials that would have otherwise
qualified for Exemption 5 are shared outside of
the Executive Branch family—even, in some occasions, with state law enforcement or with Congress—those materials may no longer be exempt
under Exemption 5.186 When assessing whether
an outside entity communicating with the agency
qualifies as an agency consultant or some other
“intra-agency” body, courts look to see whether
the outside person or group was acting only in
the agency’s interest, rather than in the person
or group’s own private interests.187 In addition,
courts are unlikely to find that an outside entity
meets the “intra/inter-agency” requirement if
the person or group is applying for a benefit in
competition with other applicants.188
Thus, a Government attorney should keep in
mind that sharing internal materials with outsiders might vitiate the applicability of Exemption
5. For example, an attorney might rightly believe
that plea discussions with a defendant would be
aided by sharing certain attorney work product
with the target’s counsel, such as drafts of the
settlement proposal or internal views regarding
the litigation. However, as seen in Center for Auto
Safety v. Department of Justice, if an attorney decides
to share materials externally in such a manner,
even if the documents appear at first to involve
the agency’s deliberative process with “personal
predecisional views of subordinate agency officials,” a court could determine that, although the
documents “may at one time have been used for
internal advisory purposes and would therefore
be protected,” sharing the documents outside
the Executive Branch family caused the docu16

ments to lose their status as an internal documents and their qualification under Exemption
5.189 If a Government attorney fails to consider
the ramification of sharing internal information
on the agency’s ability to withhold the materials
from a FOIA requester, an agency might find that
otherwise privileged materials must be released
to the public.
As noted above, Exemption 5 is most typically
invoked to protect attorney-client communications, work product, or deliberative materials.
FOIA’s protection of materials under Exemption
5 is “coextensive with the scope of the discovery
privileges it incorporates,” meaning that Exemption 5 protects attorney-client and work-product
materials in a manner that tracks how the privileges
are treated in federal courts.190 Thus, this BRIEFING P APER focuses on Exemption 5’s protection
of deliberative materials that uniquely applies to
the Government and leaves the other privileges
to the many publications that focus on these
common civil litigation privileges.191
To protect an agency’s deliberative process
from public exposure, Exemption 5 exempts from
disclosure “predecisional” materials that are part
of the process of making recommendations or
expressing opinions on legal or policy matters.192
To qualify for the exemption, the materials need
not lead to an actual agency decision. Rather, the
materials can be part of a decisionmaking process
regardless of the eventual outcome, such as part
of an agency’s continuing need to assess policies
to determine whether and what changes might
be needed.193 As a result, Exemption 5 protects a
broad universe of documents and often protects
documents with recommendations or advisory
guidance, internal communications deliberating
on agency action or policy, and most draft documents. However, Exemption 5 generally does not
protect “postdecisional” documents that provide
final policy statements and implementations, legal
opinions, or explanations of agency decisions.194
Thus, this distinction between predecisional and
postdecisional materials is critical to a court’s
determination of whether Exemption 5 applies
to the withheld documents.
Of course, courts have found gray areas between the pre- and post-decisional categories of
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materials. As the Supreme Court has noted, “the
line between predecisional documents and postdecisional documents may not always be a bright
one.”195 As one court has found, even materials
created after the agency’s final decision could
be protected if they reveal deliberations from
before the decision was made, such as an email
“where an agency employee reiterated his own
recommendations shortly after the decision was
made.”196 Nevertheless, Government attorneys
generally should be aware of the difference between these two categories when they create and
manage information regarding agency actions.
Broadly speaking, a document created to assist
the agency in making a decision is more likely
exempt from FOIA, while a document created
to provide, implement, or otherwise describe a
final decision is likely outside the scope of the
exemption. For example, a memorandum by an
IRS field officer analyzing whether to take certain
actions against an individual taxpayer would be
predecisional, i.e., antecedent of the decision
regarding the taxpayer, while documents containing legal advice to field offices for drafting such
memoranda would be postdecisional because
even though the legal advice documents “may
precede the field office’s decision in a particular
taxpayer’s case, they do not precede the decision
regarding the agency’s legal position.”197
In addition, Government attorneys should be
aware that the deliberative process privilege generally does not extend to factual information, such
as a segregable factual background section of a
deliberative memorandum. While agencies have
successfully withheld factual materials that would
expose the agency’s deliberative process, such
as factual summaries of nonfinal recommendations198 or deliberatively chosen selections of facts
presented to a decisionmaker,199 courts often find
that factual descriptions are not exempt despite
being part of a deliberative document.200 Thus,
attorneys should be mindful that any presentation
of facts, even embedded in clearly deliberative
materials, could be segregated from the document and disclosed to the FOIA requester.
■

FOIA Exemption 6

Government attorneys frequently obtain information about individuals regardless of the
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters

attorneys’ type of work. For example, people
submit personal information, such as their name,
address, social security number, and financial data
on tax forms that may be reviewed by Government attorneys. Similar information is typically
required on requests for financial benefits that
may need attorney review, such as student loan
documents. In addition, Government attorneys’
law enforcement investigations are a magnet for
personal information, whether received pursuant
to subpoenas or similar informational demands,
collected surreptitiously through wiretaps or
informants, or provided voluntarily through
consumer complaint databases or other such
reporting mechanisms.
Regardless of the method of collection, FOIA
seeks to protect the privacy of ordinary citizens,
including Government employees, by exempting from disclosure private information about
individuals.201 Exemption 6, which is applicable
to all agency materials, allows the withholding
of personal information if an agency shows that
disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.”202 There is greater
protection under another exemption for private
information in law enforcement records, which
is briefly mentioned below.
As a threshold matter, application of FOIA Exemption 6 requires that the information implicate
an “individual’s control of information concerning
his or her person,”203 which must amount to “a
substantial privacy interest”204 (i.e., more than de
minimis). Thus, if a court finds that the withheld
materials do not possess identifying information,
Exemption 6 will not apply. For example, if a
FOIA requester seeking certain agency performance reviews makes clear that the requester is
“not seeking personal identifiers of any of the
records and anticipate[s] that [the agency] will
redact these identifiers,” a court could find that
Exemption 6 does not apply given that the redacted performance reviews themselves do not
identify anyone.205 In addition, courts have required
agencies to disclose materials if the person had
somehow provided the personal information in
a manner that did not evince an expectation of
privacy. For example, in one such case, where an
agency possessed statements provided by a person
“on the record” to a reporter, the court found
17
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that a person would have no privacy expectation
in such statements.206 In another example, a court
determined that Guantanamo Bay detainees did
not have a privacy interest in statements made in
a nonpublic legal proceeding because they lacked
an expectation of privacy given that they were
not explicitly told that the proceedings would
be confidential.207
Other situations are not as clear cut for the
Government attorney. For example, courts have
differed on protecting the identity of people petitioning the Government to take certain action,
with some courts finding a lack of a privacy interest
in their identity,208 while others have found that
Exemption 6 applies to such information.209 In
addition, although many courts have found that
“the privacy interest of an individual in avoiding
the unlimited disclosure of his or her name and
address is significant,”210 a few have found only a
minimal privacy interest in such information.211
Should the agency identify a “substantial privacy
interest,” the courts determine whether revealing
that information “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” by balancing
the privacy interest in the withheld information
against the public interest in disclosure. The
“public interest” inquiry must focus on the core
purpose of FOIA—“to shed light on an agency’s
performance.”212 Thus, if the information does
not reveal anything about agency conduct, any
non-de minimis privacy interest, however small,
will justify the withholding of the materials under
Exemption 6.213 In addition, a court is not likely
to order the disclosure of information with only
an “attenuated” public interest in the release of
the materials, as seen with the courts’ recurring
protection for names and addresses of individuals
where the only possible public interest would be
to allow the requester to interview those people
about possible Government misconduct.214
In light of the difficulty predicting the existence
of a privacy interest and the fact-based nature of
the balancing test, Government attorneys should
be aware that their agencies may be required
to reveal private information that the attorneys
possess. Courts do routinely protect some types
of personal data under Exemption 6, and so
there is typically little doubt that Exemption 6
protects a person’s social security number, birth
18

date, family status, religious affiliation, and other
purely personal information that sheds little light
on agency conduct. However, for other materials containing personal information, including
the inclusion of person’s name and address in a
document, Government attorneys should consult
with their designated FOIA official regarding a
potential requirement to disclose such information
to a requester. Given that some agencies routinely
receive the same requests for certain personal
information, the official may have some specific
guidance—supported by case law—regarding the
information at issue.
Finally, for personal information obtained as part
of a law enforcement investigation, Exemption 7(C)
provides stronger, and in some cases, categorical,
protection from FOIA disclosure. This exemption
looks to whether disclosure of records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes “could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy,”215 a standard that has
allowed courts to more broadly protect private information in law enforcement records when balancing
against the public interest in disclosure. Thus, this
sort of information is likely to be protected from
FOIA, meaning that Government attorneys need
not pay the same level of concern to the potential
disclosure faced by all other private information
described above in connection with Exemption 6.
■

Whistleblower Protection Act

In addition to the required disclosure that agencies must make under FOIA, federal law encourages certain Government employees, including
many Government attorneys, to disclose certain
information that reveals Government wrongdoing
through the aptly named Whistleblower Protection Act.216 This act does not provide a mechanism
for blowing the whistle or even provide federal
employees with guidance on how to do so.
Rather, the WPA protects certain federal employees—after the fact—by prohibiting their managers
from taking or failing to take a “personnel action”
(or threatening such action) as a result of a whistleblowing disclosure.217 The WPA deﬁnes “personnel
action” as, for example, including an appointment,
a promotion, a disciplinary or corrective action,
a detail, transfer, or reassignment, a decision
concerning pay, beneﬁts, awards, or education or
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters
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training, or any other signiﬁcant change in duties,
responsibilities, or working conditions.218 Thus, the
WPA prevents retaliatory personnel actions against
certain federal employees who reveal evidence of
illegal or improper Government activity.219 While, at
ﬁrst glance, the WPA appears straightforward, the
language of the statute and interpretive case law
make clear that the WPA’s provisions are restrictive
and narrowly construed.

Branch agency) and many of the intelligencegathering agencies, such as the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency,
and the National Security Agency, in light of the
classified or otherwise sensitive information in
their possession.226 Many of these agencies have
their own whistleblower statutes or otherwise
provide protection similar to that afforded by
the WPA.227

Specifically, there are significant exceptions
to the WPA, some of which are described below,
and Government attorneys should be aware of
the limits to the WPA’s protection when considering whether to “blow the whistle.” The
high profile case of Coleen Rowley provides
an example. The former FBI attorney wrote a
memorandum to then-FBI Director Robert Mueller, which she also provided to two members of
the Senate Committee on Intelligence, about
what she described as her agency’s mishandling
of 9/11 terrorist Zacarais Moussaoui. 220 At the
end of her memorandum, she stated without
elaboration that she “wish[ed] to take advantage of the federal ‘Whistleblower Protection’
provisions” in making her remarks. 221 However,
“[a]t the time, she did not know exactly what
[the Act] was—nor that the legislation offered
FBI employees a weak shield.” 222 Thus, before
blowing the whistle, all Government attorneys
should be clear about the extent that the WPA
may protect them in light of where they work
and the potential revelation.

Next, Government attorneys should determine if
the disclosure itself would trigger the protections
of the WPA. The subject matter of the disclosure
must be information that the Government attorney
“reasonably believes” is evidence of “a violation of
any law, rule, or regulation…gross mismanagement,
a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a
substantial and speciﬁc danger to public health or
safety.”228 Thus, the disclosure must be about a legal
violation or a nontrivial mismanagement, waste,
or threat to the public, such as the allegation in
Coons v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, in which the whistleblower alleged that
the IRS processed a large, fraudulent refund for
a wealthy taxpayer.229 As explained in the WPA’s
legislative history, the act is “a means to protect
the Pentagon employee who discloses billions of
dollars in cost overruns, the [General Services Administration] employee who discloses widespread
fraud, and the nuclear engineer who questions
the safety of certain nuclear plants.”230 The WPA
does not cover mere “disagreement” over policy
choices231 or “arguably minor and inadvertent
miscues occurring in the conscientious carrying
out of one’s assigned duties.”232

As a starting point, a Government attorney
should determine whether his or her particular
position is under the protective umbrella of the
WPA. The protections broadly apply to those
in “covered positions”—current, former, and
even prospective executive employees in the
competitive and the excepted service, as well as
Senior Executive Service personnel. 223 The WPA,
however, carves out positions that are “excepted
from the competitive service” because their “confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or
policy-advocating character” are not eligible for
the WPA’s protection.224 In addition, the President may specifically exclude positions from the
WPA’s coverage.225 The WPA also excludes the
employees of certain agencies, including the
Government Accountability Office (a Legislative
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters

In addition, an attorney may not be protected
if the disclosure of information is expressly prohibited by law or by Executive Order.233 If such a
disclosure is prohibited by law or Executive Order,
then the protections only apply if the disclosure
is made to the OSC or to an agency’s Inspector
General or designated recipient of such disclosures.234 Consequently, under most circumstances,
if such a disclosure is made to another individual
or organization, the protections are unlikely to
be available to the attorney. Thus, a Government
attorney who wants to disclose information with
the expectation of whistleblower protection to the
media, for example, should ﬁrst determine whether
the disclosure would otherwise violate the law.235
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Government attorneys who believe that they
need the protection of the WPA have a number of options. Depending on their particular
circumstances, they may seek redress in one
of several different forums, including, seeking
an individual right of action before the MSPB,
pursuing corrective action from the OSC, or by
filing a grievance under their agency’s negotiated
grievance procedures.236

While the WPA encourages Government attorneys to reveal certain information about their
clients, attorneys should fully understand the
protections available to them before actually
blowing the whistle. Thus, as other areas of the
law discussed in this BRIEFING PAPER, attorneys are
encouraged to seek the advice of an agency ethics
official or a representative from the Whistleblowing unit of the OSC before taking further action.

GUIDELINES
These Guidelines are intended to assist you in
understanding the ethical standards to which
Government attorneys must adhere in conducting
Government business. They are not, however, a
substitute for professional representation in any
specific situation.
1. Government attorneys should be cautious
when offered an item from a person doing business before the attorney’s employing agency.
Although there are numerous exceptions to the
rule prohibiting gifts from these individuals,
there is fine line between acceptable items and
those that violate the law.
2. If an attorney is prohibited from directly
accepting a gift, indirect receipt through an
intermediary (such as a spouse or minor child)
is also prohibited.
3. Government attorneys must be cautious
before using Government property or spending
official time on a personal matter. While many
agencies allow de minimis use, the exception is
narrowly construed.
4. Government attorneys must be very careful before discussing prospective employment
opportunities with persons doing business with
the attorney’s employing agency. It is always advisable to consult with an agency ethics official
to determine whether disqualification from a
particular matter is necessary.
5. Government attorneys should avoid engaging in activities or taking an action that raises
concerns regarding an appearance of the loss of
impartiality. Although the activity or action may
not be expressly prohibited under the law, if it
merely “looks bad,” the activity or action should
be avoided.
20

6. Government attorneys generally have a
duty of confidentiality to their client agencies,
as defined and regulated by their specific state
bar rules.
7. Government attorneys should be aware that
the Freedom of Information Act allows members
of the general public to request any documents
from the attorneys’ agency, unless a specific FOIA
exemption applies to the document in question
that exempts it from disclosure.
8. Government attorneys should remember
that even exempt materials might end up in the
hands of the public should the agency’s FOIA
official choose to release them. In addition, if a
requested document is exempt from FOIA disclosure but has segregable portions that are not
exempt, those portions must be released to the
requester.
9. Government attorneys who possess or
seek confidential business information should
be aware that FOIA’s Exemption 4 specifically
exempts from disclosure trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from
a person that are privileged or confidential.
10. Government attorneys should keep in mind
that FOIA Exemption 5 exempts from disclosure certain internal privileged attorney-client
communications and attorney work product, as
well as any predecisional deliberative materials,
but that sharing such materials outside of the
Executive Branch family could cause Exemption
5 to no longer apply to otherwise exempted
materials.
11. Government attorneys should be aware that
FOIA Exemption 6 also exempts from disclosure
certain private personal information, but that
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters
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private information that bears on the agency’s
conduct could trigger its disclosure.
12. The Whistleblower Protection Act only
provides certain Government attorneys with
after-the-fact protection against retaliatory personnel actions, and these protections apply to
only certain disclosures. Government attorneys
should consult with their agencies’ Inspector

General or with the Office of Special Counsel
to determine whether their positions qualify for
the WPA’s protection.
13. Government attorneys are only protected
under the WPA if disclosure involves information that the employee “reasonably believes”
is evidence of a legal violation or a nontrivial
mismanagement, waste, or threat to the public.
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